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MINNESOTA'S DRAMSHOP ACT: IS THE COMPLICITY
DOCTRINE OBSOLETE?
[Herrly v. Muzik, 374 N.W.2d 275 (Minn. 1985)].
INTRODUCTION
Who should bear the loss when a commercial vendor of alcoholic
beverages illegally serves an individual who becomes intoxicated and
subsequently injures a third party? In states that have "dram shop"
or "civil damage" acts,' the loss will likely be borne by the commer-
cial vendor. Such statutes create a remedy for "innocent third par-
ties"2 who are injured by an individual who has been served
"illegally." 3 In these situations, Minnesota is one state that has
placed the loss on the commercial vendor.
In Herrly v. Muzik,4 the Minnesota Supreme Court restricted the
potential plaintiffs who are eligible for a remedy under Minnesota's
Dram Shop Act. The statute as interpreted in Herrly does not pro-
vide a remedy for persons who bought or procured intoxicants for
the injuring party. 5 Such individuals are said to be "in complicity
with" or to be "complicious with" 6 the commercial liquor vendor,
and therefore, must bear the liability of their own actions.
The complicity preclusion is not a new doctrine under Minnesota
law.7 The Herrly decision is significant, however, in that the court,
for the first time, held that complicity is unaffected by the compara-
1. These terms are used interchangeably to refer to the portion of the state's
liquor control statute which imposes civil liability on commercial liquor vendors. For
the text of Minnesota's Act, MINN. STrXr. § 340A.801 (Supp. 1985), see infro note 38.
2. The requirement that the plaintiff be an "innocent third party" is a judicial
creation, This requirement typically excludes both the intoxicated/injuring pary
and the complicious plaintiff from recovering under the Act. For further discussion,
see infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
3. The requirement of an illegal sale is imposed by the express language of the
statute. For further discussion, see iiifia notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
4. 374 N.W.2d 275 (Minn. 1985).
5. This bar is raised only when the plaintiff has played an active role in intoxi-
cating the injuring party. This typically involves the purchase or procurement of in-
toxicants by the injured party for the injuring party. For further discussion of this
topic, see infa notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
6. These terms are used synonymously throughoui this Comment.
7. See, e.g., Martinson v. Monticello Municipal Liquors, 297 Minn. 48, 52-53,
209 N.W.2d 902, 905 (1973) (person who knowingly and actively participates in the
events leading to the intoxication may not recover under the Minnesota Dram Shop
Ac).
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tive fault provision of the statute. 8 Reversing the decision of the
Minnesota Court of Appeals,!) the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that the complicity preclusion is unaffected by the express incorpora-
tion of comparative fault o into the Dram Shop Act.I I As a result of
this decision, most plaintiff misconduct will be compared against the
defendant's fault and will merely reduce the plaintiffs recovery in
proportion to his respective fault.-12 The purchasing of intoxicants
by the plaintiff for the injuring party, however, will be an absolute
bar to recovery.
This Comment will first provide a brief overview of the history and
public policy objectives underlying dram shop legislation. Second,
an explanation of the Minnesota Dram Shop Act and the compara-
tive fault statute will be given. Finally, the Comment will analyze the
supreme court's rationale in Herrly. The Comment will suggest that
a more appropriate decision would have placed complicity within the
purview of the comparative fault formula provided for in the Act.
Such a holding would have been more consistent with Minnesota's
civil liquor liability reforms, and with the court's prior decisions in-
terpreting the Dram Shop Act. ' 3
Regardless of the rectitude of the Herrly decision, the case is im-
portant to any practitioner who is attempting to understand this rap-
idly changing area of the law. 14 With national concern over the
8. See infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
9. Herrly v. Muzik, 355 N.W.2d 452 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
10. MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1984). For the complete text of the statute, see infa
note 37. The plaintiff argued that his admitted complicity should proportionately
reduce, rather than preclude, his recovery. His position was accepted by the Minne-
sota Court of Appeals. See Henly, 355 N.W.2d at 455.
11. MINN. STAT. § 340A.801 (Supp. 1985).
12. It is important to distinguish complicity, which will not be compared under
MINN. STAT. § 604.01, from other forms of plaintiff misconduct which will be com-
pared. See, e.g., Pautz v. Cal-Ros, Inc., 340 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Minn. 1983) (liquor
establishment entitled to contribution from injuring party where injuring party's neg-
ligence as well as defendant liquor establishment's illegal sale caused injuries to third
parties). For a discussion of the comparison formula, see infra notes 93-95 and ac-
companying text.
13. See supra note 117-20 and accompanying text.
14. In 1985, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided two other cases which will
have a substantial impact on civil liquor liability. The court in Meany v. Newell, 367
N.W.2d 472 (Minn. 1985); and Holmquist v. Miller, 367 N.W.2d 468 (Minn. 1985),
made two clear pronouncements affecting dram shop litigation. First, Minnesota's
Dram Shop Act preempts common law remedies with respect to liability for furnish-
ing intoxicants. Second, Minnesota's Dram Shop Act does not impose liability on
social hosts. Veany, 367 N.W.2d at 476 (employer sponsoring a Christmas party is
social host and incurs no liability if intoxicated employee causes injury to another);
Holnquist, 367 N.W.2d at 471 (no social host liability for serving minor). Denial of
social host liability expressly rejects Ross v. Ross. 294 Minn. 115. 200 NA.2d 149
(1972). Ross, however, had been earlier rendered inelfective when the legislature
deleted the words "or giving" from the Dram Shop Act. The effect of this deletion
[Vol. 12
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drunk driving phenomenon, dram shop legislation will undoubtedly
receive continued attention as a mechanism for addressing this
concern. 15
I. COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENT
At common law, courts did not recognize a cause of action against
commercial vendors when the vendor's intoxicated patrons caused
off-premises injuries to others.16 The rationale for the common law
denial of liability was the refusal, as a matter of social policy, to rec-
ognize the liquor vendor's sale as the proximate cause of the plain-
tiffs injury.17 The consumption rather than the sale was seen as the
proximate cause of a third party's injuries. 18 As the Minnesota
Supreme Court stated in Swinfin v. Lowry in 1887, "[w]e think the
damages claimed [are] too remote. The assault must be considered
as the voluntary and wrongful act of [the injuring party], and was not
so related to the fact that he drank intoxicating liquors with the de-
fendants . . . as to be considered the natural and proximate
result." 19
The rigid common law rule began to erode around the turn of the
century. Pressure applied by the temperance movement2 O resulted
was to prevent a party who gives liquor to another from incurring liability under the
statute. See Act of June 2, 1977, ch. 390, § 1. 1977 Minn. Laws 887 (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. § 340A.801 (Supp. 1985)).
15. The impetus for recent liquor liability reform, which provided statutory
causes of action, stems from the increasing percentage of traffic fatalities attributable
to drunk driving. See generallV Comment, Liabilitv of Commercial Vendors, Emplovers and
Social Hosts for Torts ofthe Intoxicated. 19 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1013 (1983).
16. Common law liability did not exist with respect to injuries caused by intoxi-
cated patrons when the injuries occurred off the vendor's premises. See, e.g., Cowman
v. Hansen, 250 Iowa 358, 92 N.W.2d 682 (1958): Swinfin v. Lowry, 37 Minn. 345, 34
N.W. 22 (1887); Demge v. Feierstein, 222 Wis. 199, 268 N.W. 210 (1936).
Common law liability existed with respect to foreseeable injuries occurring on
the commercial vendor's premises. See, e.g., Filas v. Daher, 300 Minn. 137, 218
N.W.2d 467 (1974); Swanson v. The Dugout, Inc.. 256 Minn. 371, 98 N.W.2d 213
(1959); Klingbeil v. Truesdell, 256 Minn. 360, 98 N.W.2d 134 (1959); Priewe v.
Bartz, 249 Minn. 488, 83 N.W.2d 116 (1957): Windorski v. Doyle, 219 Minn. 402, 18
N.W.2d 142 (1945).
17. See, e.g., Wright v. Moflitt, 437 A.2d 554, 556 (Del. 1981); Felder v. Butler.
292 Md. 174, 177, 438 A.2d 494, 499 (1981); Hall v. Budagher, 76 N.M. 591, 594,
417 P.2d 71, 74 (1966).
18. See, e.g., Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 266 A.2d 383 (1967): Swinfin. 37
Minn. at 346-47, 34 N.W. at 22. See Comment. The Common l.aw Liabilitv of.3lmnsota
Liquor 'endors for Ijuries .AIrism From .\egli ri Sales. 49 MINN. L. REv. 1154, 1156
(1965).
19. Swinfin, 37 Minn. at 346, 34 N.W. at 22.
20. See Comment, The l.iabilily of Social losts lor Their htao.icaled G,iess'.cciiddts:
An Extension Of The L.aw, 18 AKRON 1L. RExV. 473. 474 (1985).
19861
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in experimentation with both statutory liability2l and common law
liability.22 By the repeal of prohibition in 1933, thirty-seven states
had enacted statutes imposing liability on commercial vendors.23
These statutes-dram shop acts-were intended to circumvent the
common law denial of liability as articulated in Swinfin.24
Minnesota's Dram Shop Act was enacted in 191 1.25 The statute
contained broad and sweeping language creating liability for the fur-
nishing of intoxicants. The language of the statute has remained
substantially unchanged in the intervening 75 years.2 6 Its general
language has allowed the courts to make adjustments in the scope of
the Act without major changes in its language.27
In addition to the dram shop acts, a vendor's liability has been
established by an alternative theory-negligence per se. Negligence
per se was facilitated through liquor control statutes. While many
states were reluctant to adopt express statutory civil liability for li-
quor vendors, almost all states had liquor control statutes.28 These
statutes prohibited the sale of liquor to minors,29 to intoxicated per-
21. These early statutes required the liquor vendor to post a bond as a condition
of doing business and allowed injured parties to recover liquidated damages for vio-
lations of the statutory requirements. See Comment, Common Law Liability of Liquor
Vendors, 12 BAYLOR L. REV. 388, 398 (1960).
22. This approach was based upon a negligence per se theory. See infra notes 28-
35 and accompanying text.
23. Note, Social Host Liabilit ' for Funnishing Liquoi-Finding a Basis for Recover , in
Kentucky, 3 N. Ky. L. REV. 229, 231 (1976).
24. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
25. The Act as originally set forth reads as follows:
Action for injuries caused by intoxicated person.
- Section 1. Ever% husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or
other person, who shall be injured in person or property, or means of sup-
port, by any intoxicated person, or by the intoxication of any, person, shall
have a right of action, in his or her own name, against any person, who shall
by illegally selling, bartering, or giving intoxicating liquors, have caused the
intoxication of such person, for all damages sustained; and all damages re-
covered by a minor under this act shall be paid either to such minor or to his
or her parent, guardian, or next friend, as the court shall direct; and all suits
for damages under this act shall be by civil action in an' of the courts of this
state having jurisdiction thereof.
Act of April 18, 1911, ch. 175. 1911 Minn. Laws 221.
26. Compare id. with MINN. Srx'r. § 340A.801.
27. See, e.g., HenV, 374 N.W.2d 275 (complicity doctrine unaffected by compara-
tive fault); Holmquist, 367 N.W.2d 468 (denial of social host liability); Turk v. Long
Branch Saloon, Inc., 280 Minn. 438. 159 N.W.2d 903 (1968) (only innocent third
parties have dram shop remedies).
28. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
29. E.g., GA. ConE ANN. § 3-3-23 (Snpp. 1985): IND. CODE ANN. § 7.1-5-7-8
(West 1982). The Georgia statute provides, in pertinent part: "'No person know-
ingly, directly or through anolher person shall furnish, cause to be furnished, or per-
mit any person in such person's employ to furnish any alcoholic beverage to any
person under 20 years of age .... . GA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-23.
[Vol. 12
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sons, 30 or to both.31 The courts began to interpret these laws as
though they were designed to protect injured third parties. Through
these liquor control statutes, vendors had an implied duty to their
customers which, if breached, established negligence per se.
32
Minnesota recognized the negligence per se alternative in Windor-
ski v. Doyle.33 The plaintiff prevailed under a negligence per se the-
ory, citing the defendant's violation of a St. Paul liquor ordinance.
34
Recent pronouncements by the Minnesota Supreme Court, however,
have cast doubt on the continued viability of negligence per se as a
theory of recovery for injuries caused by the furnishing of intoxicants
to an intoxicated individual.35
II. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Understanding the issue in Herrly v. Muzik36 requires an under-
30. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26:683 (West 1975). GA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-22
(1982), provides: "No alcoholic beverage shall be sold, bartered, exchanged, given,
provided, or furnished to any person who is in a state of noticeable intoxication." Id.
31. E.g., ALA. CODE § 28-7-21 (Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 48-529 (1977);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-47-128 (1978 & Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 30-86 (West
Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE § 23-312 (1977). The Colorado statute provides, in perti-
nent part: "(1) It is unlawful for any person: (a) To sell, serve, give away, dispose ot,
exchange, or deliver or permit the sale, serving, giving, or procuring of any malt,
vinous, or spiritous liquor to or for any person under the age of twenty-one years, to
a visibly intoxicated person, or to a known habitual drunkard." COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 12-47-128.
32. See llindorski, 219 Minn. 402, 18 N.W.2d 142; Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 NJ.
188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
33. 219 Minn. 402, 18 N.W.2d 142 (1985).
34. Defendant liquor vendor sold an obviously intoxicated person liquor in viola-
tion of St. Paul Ordinance No. 7537, Section 23, providing: "No liquor shall be sold
or furnished for any purpose whatever to . . .one obviously intoxicated ....
35. The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the Dram Shop Act preempts all
other remedies available for wrongs arising from improper sale of intoxicating bever-
ages. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lamott, 289 N.W.2d 60 (Minn. 1979). In 1985, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court decided the case of Holmquist v. Miller, 367 N.W.2d 468
(Minn. 1985). Holmquist, in addition to denying social host liability under the Dram
Shop Act, takes the preemption a step further. The appeals court allowed Holm-
quist to proceed on a negligence per se theory. Holmquist v. Miller, 352 N.W.2d 47,
51 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). Since Holmquist presented a social host fact situation and
the legislature expressly removed social host liability under the Dram Shop Act, the
plaintiff in Holmquist was not aided by the Dram Shop Act. Instead, he proceeded on
a negligence per se theory. This theory was accepted by the court of appeals Id..
The claim was based upon a violation of Minnesota Statutes section 340.73 which
forbids furnishing intoxicants to minors. Id. The supreme court rejected the negli-
gence per se theory, indicating that the Dram Shop Act was indeed an exclusive rem-
edy. Holmquist, 367 N.W.2d at 471. Previous Minnesota cases allowing a cause of'
action based on negligence per se must now be viewed skeptically. E.g., Trail v.
Christian, 298 Minn. 101, 213 N.W.2d 618 (1973) lliudorski 219 Minn. 402. 18
N.W.2d 142.
36. 374 N.W.2d 275 (Minn. 1985).
19861
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standing of Minnesota's comparative fault statute3 7 and the Dram
Shop Act.38 The issue in Herrly arose because the legislature incor-
porated comparative fault into the language of the Dram Shop Act.39
A. Dram Shop Act
A successful suit under Minnesota's Dram Shop Act requires the
plaintiff to prove three statutory elements. The plaintiff must estab-
lish: (1) an illegal sale40 by a commercial vendor;41 (2) proper causa-
37. Subdivision one of Minnesota Statutes section 604.01 provides:
Scope of application. Contributory fault shall not bar recovery in an action
by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for fault result-
ing in death or in injury to person or property, if the contributory fault was
not greater than the fault of the person against whom recovery is sought,
but any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of
fault attributable to the person recovering. The court may, and when re-
quested by any party shall, direct the jury to find separate special verdicts
determining the amount of damages and the percentage of fault attributable
to each party; and the court shall then reduce the amount of damages in
proportion to the amount of fault attributable to the person recovering.
MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1 (1984).
38. Minnesota Statutes section 340A.801 provides:
Subdivision 1. Right of action. A spouse, child, parent, guardian, em-
ployer, or other person injured in person, property, or means of support by
an intoxicated person or by the intoxication of another person, has a right of
action in the person's own name for all damages sustained against a person
who caused the intoxication of that person by illegally selling alcoholic bev-
erages. All damages recovered by a minor under this section must be paid
either to the minor or to the minor's parent, guardian, or next friend as the
court directs.
Subd. 2. Actions. All suits for lamages under this section must be by
civil action in a court of this state having jurisdiction.
Subd. 3. Comparative negligence. Actions under this section are gover-
ened by section 604.01.
Subd. 4. Subrogation claims denied. There shall be no recovery by any
insurance company against any liquor vendor under subrogation clauses of
the uninsured, underinsured, collision, or other first party coverges of a mo-
tor vehicle insurance policy as a result of payments made by the company to
persons who have claims that arise in whole or part under this section. The
provisions of section 65B.53. subdivision 3, do not apply to actions tinder
this section.
Subd. 5. Presumed damages in case of death. In the case of an individual
who is deceased and where a person is found liable under this section for a
person's death, the individual or those claiming damages oii the person's
behalf, shall be conclusively presumed collectively to be damaged in a iiiini-
mum amount of $30,000: provided, however, that nothing herein shall pre-
vent a claimant from recovering a greater amount of damages to the extent
allowable and proven tinder (his section.
MINN. STAT. § 340A.801 (Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
39. See id.
40. For the text of the statute, see su/ra note 37. For a complete discussion of
illegal sales, see infra text accompanrying notes 50-55.
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tion;42 and (3) a recognized form of injury.43 In addition to these
statutory elements, the plaintiff must also demonstrate that he is an
"innocent third party."44 Since a complicious plaintiff is not an in-
nocent third party, this consideration bears on the defense available
to the defendant and, therefore, is not an element of the suit. None-
theless, status as an innocent third party was central to the issue in
Herrly and will be discussed as a fourth element to be proved.
Minnesota courts have ruled that dram shop actions are available
only to "innocent third parties."45 This limitation has two effects.
First, voluntarily intoxicated persons, who are themselves injured by
their own actions, are denied a cause of action under the statute.4 6
In other words, only injuries which an intoxicated person causes to
others will create a right of action. 4 7 Second, persons who have "ac-
tively participated" in the process of intoxicating the injuring party
are not innocent third parties and, therefore, do not have a cause of
action under Minnesota's Act.48 The only conduct that courts have
construed as active participation has been the purchasing or pro-
curement of intoxicants for the injuring party. The distinction be-
tween passive participation and active participation is, however,
nebulous. A person may have been substantially involved in causing
the injuring party's intoxication but, as long as he has not furnished
liquor, the involvement will be deemed passive and it will not raise
the complicity preclusion.49 Only active participation raises the com-
plicity preclusion.
In addition to establishing that he is an innocent third party, the
plaintiff must establish an illegal sale. The statute defines illegal
sales as sales to minors and sales to "obviously intoxicated per-
42. See infra notes 58-71 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Turk, 280 Minn. at 442, 159 N.W.2d at 906 ("innocent third party" is
one who has had nothing to do with illegal furnishing of liquor to intoxicated
wrongdoer).
46. See, e.g., Vartinson, 297 Minn. at 54, 209 N.W.2d at 906; Empire Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Williams, 265 Minn. 333, 337, 121 N.W.2d 580, 583 (1963). The
fact that the voluntarily intoxicated person is a minor does not create an exception to
denying the intoxicated person a remedy. See, e.g., Randall v. Village of Excelsior,
258 Minn. 81, 84, 103 N.W.2d 131, 134 (1960).
47. For a complete discussion of the injuries recognized by the Dram Shop Act,
see infra text accompanying notes 72-81.
48. Active participation occurs when the injured party procures intoxicants for
the injuring party. Active participation raises the complicity preclusion. See, e.g., Her-
fly, 374 N.W.2d at 278; 11artinson, 297 Minn. at 53, 209 N.W.2d at 905. But c.f
Hempstead v. Minneapolis Sheraton Corp., 283 Minn. 1, 9, 166 N.W.2d 95, 99
(1969) (merely accompanying the intoxicated person is not active participation and
will not raise the complicity preclusion).
49. See infra text accompanying note 107.
CO.1II1I.ICIT" DOCTR'/IA'E'
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sons."50 Beyond the statutory definition of an illegal sale, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court has held that after hours sales are illegal sales
for purposes of the Dram Shop Act.51
Although Minnesota's Dram Shop Act is a strict liability statute,
not dependent upon the vendor's negligence,52 the court has articu-
lated a negligence-type standard for determining when someone is
"obviously intoxicated." Under Jaros v. Warroad Municipal Liquor
Store, 5 3 "a person is [obviously] intoxicated if his intoxication is or
should be discoverable by a reasonably active observation ...... 54
Merely being under the influence will not necessarily qualify as "ob-
viously intoxicated."55
In addition to the illegal sale, the plaintiff must establish that the
sale was made by a commercial vendor. The Minnesota Supreme
Court and the Minnesota Legislature have recently decided that the
Dram Shop Act does not impose liability upon social hosts.56 Thus,
by a process of elimination, only commercial vendors fall within the
purview of the Act. 57
50. Minnesota Statutes sections 340A.502 and 340A.503 provide:
340A.502 SALES TO OBVIOUSLY INTOXICATED PERSONS.
No person may sell, give, furnish, or in any way procure for another
alcoholic beverages for the use of an obviously intoxicated person.
Minn. Stat. § 304A.502 (Supp. 1985).
340A.503 PERSONS UNDER 19; ILLEGAL ACTS.
Subdivision 1. Consumption. It is unlawful for any:
(1) retail intoxicating liquor or nonintoxicating liquor licensee or bottle
club permit holder under section 340A.414, to permit any person under the
age of 19 years to consume alcoholic beverages on the licensed premises;
Subd. 2. Purchasing. It is unlawful for any person:
(1) to sell, barter, furnish, or give alcoholic beverages to a person under
19 years of age, except that a parent or guardian of a person under the age
of 19 years may give or furnish alcoholic beverges to that person solely for
consumption in the household of the parent or guardian;
Minn. Stat. § 340A.503 (Supp. 1985).
51. Hollerich v. City of Good Thunder, 340 N.W.2d 665 (Minn. 1983) (prohibi-
tion against after-hour sales sufficiently related to purposes of Dram Shop Act that
such sales constitute "illegal sales" within meaning of statute).
52. See Dahl v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis, 265 Minn. 216, 220, 121
N.W.2d 321, 324 (1963); Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428, 433, 57 N.W.2d
254, 259 (1953).
53. 303 Minn. 289, 227 N.W.2d 376 (1975).
54. Id. at 295, 227 N.W.2d at 380-81 (emphasis added).
55. Strand v. Village of Watson, 245 Minn. 414, 422, 72 N.W.2d 609, 615 (1956).
56. See supra note 14.
57. In Meany, 367 N.W.2d 472, the court confronted the question of whether an
employer providing liquor at an office Christmas party was a commercial vendor.
The plaintiff argued that the Christmas party was an employee benefit intended as an
inducement to employment and, thus, the liquor was not "given" so as to preclude
liability under the Dram Shop Act. In other words, the employer was not a social
host immune from liability. The court ruled that the employer was indeed a social
host. Further, the court suggested that the vendor must be in the business of selling
liquor for a commercial sale to occur. Id. at 474. See also supra note 14.
[Vol. 12
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The plaintiff must also establish the causal connections between
the defendant's acts and the plaintiff's injuries. Establishing the nec-
essary causal connections requires a two-part showing: "[A] claim-
ant must, first, establish that the illegal sale contributed to the
intoxication, and, second, that the intoxication contributed to cause
the injury." 5 8 The Minnesota Supreme Court has articulated a cau-
sation standard for the first aspect of causation-the connection be-
tween the sale and the intoxication, but has not established a
standard for the second-the connection between the intoxication
and the injury. Although Minnesota courts frequently speak in terms
of "proximate" causation, the term is somewhat misleading in the
context of Minnesota's Dram Shop Act. Since the impetus behind
dram shop legislation was the desire to circumvent the "common law
rule," which held that furnishing liquor is not the proximate cause of
injuries inflicted by the intoxicated person, the requisite standard
had to be something more lenient than common law proximate
causation.
The standard for the first causation component was articulated in
Hahn v. City of Ortonville. 59 The Hahn court held that "the liquor sold
need not be the sole cause of the intoxication but it is enough if it is a
cooperating, concurring, or proximately contributing cause." 60 Sim-
ilarly, in Murphy v. Hennen,6 ' the Minnesota Supreme Court stated
that the "claims asserted under the [Dram Shop Act] must be sus-
tained if the evidence is sufficient to permit a finding that the defend-
ant made one or more illegal sales of intoxicants ....... 62 Under
this standard, a single illegal sale could create liability. Thus, it is
easy to conceive of a situation where an illegal sale would create
dram shop liability, even though the same circumstances would not
satisfy the common law "but for" test for causation in fact.63 In or-
der to break this easily-demonstrated chain of causation between the
sale and the intoxication, the defendant must show that the injuring
party experienced a period of sobriety between the sale and the sub-
58. Hollerich, 340 N.W.2d at 668.
59. 238 Minn. 428, 57 N.W.2d 254 (1953).
60. Id. at 432, 57 N.W.2d at 258-59.
61. Murphy v. Hennen, 264 Minn. 457, 119 N.W.2d 489 (1963).
62. Id. at 460, 119 N.W.2d at 491 .
63. For example, suppose an individual became intoxicated in his own home on
intoxicants which were purchased at a time when he was sober. Assume further that,
he later purchased a single drink from a commercial vendor at a time when he was
obviously intoxicated. Finally, assume that the intoxicated person returned home
and accidently burned his home to the ground after he passed out with a lit cigarette.
It is clearly false to say that "but for" the one drink sold by the commercial vendor
the accident would not have happened. Yet, under the Vwph v and Hahn standards,
the third parties injured in the fire by proving the facts discussed above would satisf%
the causation requirements necessary to maintain a dram shop action against the
commercial vendor of the single drink.
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sequent injuring act." 4
Less certainty exists regarding the standard for the second causa-
tion component-the connection between the intoxication and the
injuring act. Originally, Minnesota's position on dram shop causa-
tion was that "[t]he causal connection between the use of intoxicat-
ing liquor and [the] resulting injury or death is always a fact
question."65 In other words, the courts would not be determining,
as a matter of law, that this causal connection is lacking. Thus, in
Sworski v. Coleman,66, the causation question was left to the jury where
the liquor vendor sold liquor to an individual who was later jailed for
boisterous behavior, and then committed suicide while in jail. The
Sworski court felt that the connection between the intoxication and
the suicide was not, as a matter of law, insufficient.
There has been a partial retreat from the position that the second
causation aspect is always a fact question. In a recent case,6 7 the
Minnesota Supreme Court decided that, as a matter of law, serving
liquor is not the proximate cause of injuries inflicted by a third per-
son who had been encouraged by the intoxicated person to inflict the
injuries.68 This ruling demonstrates the reluctance of courts to rule,
as a matter of law, that causation is lacking. Thus, the connection
between the intoxication and the injuring act must be extremely ten-
uous for the court to rule that causation is lacking.
There may well be significant practical difficulties which the plain-
tiff may encounter in attempting to satisfy the causation require-
ments under Minnesota's Dram Shop Act.69 The legal hurdles,
however, will be few. For the most part, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has left the question of causation to the jury. Very few exam-
ples exist where the Minnesota court has held, as a matter of law,
that the causal link between the defendant's actions and the plain-
tiff's injuries is insufficient. This position represents a radical depar-
ture from the common law rule expressed in Swinfin, where the court
decided, as a matter of law, that furnishing liquor is not the proxi-
64. See, e.g., Trail, 286 Minn. 380, 389, 175 N.W.2d 916, 921-22 (injuring parties
attained sobriety between time of illegal sale and the subsequent injuries, therefore,
causal connection lacking).
65. Sworski v. Coleman, 208 Minn. 43, 46, 293 N.W. 297, 298 (1940).
66. 208 Minn. 43, 293 N.W. 297 (1940).
67. Crea v. Bly, 298 N.W.2d 66 (Minn. 1980).
68. Id. at 66.
69. Plaintiffs showing on the causation question, as well as on the other statutory
elements, typically would require testimony from other patrons of the liquor vendor.
Testimony from other patrons would present inherent problems of witness credibil-
ity in the jurors' eyes. Especially in the context of"on sale" liquor vendors, plaintiff's
witnesses' testimony may well be vulnerable to impeachment. For example, the in-
jured party may have to rely on witnesses who themselves may be intoxicated.
[Vol  12
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mate cause of injuries inflicted by the intoxicated person. 70 Given
jurors' inability to distinguish between what they deem as causes of
an occurrence, and what are in fact only necessary conditions to an
occurrence, 7' the causation element appears quite favorable to
plaintiffs.
The final element of the statutory dram shop action to be proved is
the injury. The statute provides for recovery for injuries "in person
or property or means of support." 72 The Minnesota Supreme Court
has interpreted these terms liberally. The court purports to give
these terms their common sense meaning, 73 although arguably, the
court has gone beyond what common sense would suggest. In any
event, the court has indicated a willingness to apply the Dram Shop
Act to a wide range of injuries.74
The liberal interpretation of the injury requirement is best illus-
trated by the court's decisions regarding injury to property. In
Glaesemann v. Village of New Brighton, 7 5 the Minnesota Supreme Court
decided that injury to property included the loss of prospective earn-
ings and services by the parents of a minor child.76 In Village of
Brooten v. Cudahy Packing Co., 77 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
allowed an employer to maintain an injury to property claim because
accidents caused by intoxicated employees required the employer to
pay higher insurance premiums.78
Injury in means of support has also received a liberal construction
by the courts. The test of whether a means of support injury has
occurred is whether the plaintiff has been "deprived of the support
70. Swhinfi, 37 Minn. 345, 346, N.W. 23.
71. For a scholarly treatment of the legal implications involved in the distinction
between causes and necessary conditions, see HART, CAUSATION IN LAW (1985).
72. For the complete text of the statute, see supra note 38.
73. See Glaesemann v. Village of New Brighton, 268 Minn. 432, 130 N.W.2d 43
(1964) ("property" will be construed in its ordinary and generally accepted mean-
ing); Bundy v. City of Fridley, 265 Minn. 549, 122 N.W.2d 585 (1963) (term "means
of support" is to be given its natural and ordinary meaning consistent with common
usage of term).
74. See infra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
75. 268 Minn. 432, 130 N.W.2d 43 (1964).
76. Id. at 435, 130 N.W.2d at 45.
77. 291 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1961) (applying Minnesota law).
78. Id. at 300. In 1985, the Minnesota Legislature expressly denied subrogation
claims under the Act by insurers against commercial vendors:
There shall be no recovery by any insurance company against any liquor
vendor under subrogation clauses of the uninsured, underinsured, collision,
or other first party coverages of a motor vehicle insurance policy as a result
of payments made by the company to persons who have claims that arise in
whole or part under this section. The provisions of section 65B.53, subdivi-
sion 3, do not apply to actions under this section.
Act of May 10, 1985, ch. 309, § 12, 1985 Minn. Laws 1537, 1546-47 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 340A.801, subd. 4 (Supp. 1985)).
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which he had theretofore enjoyed. ' 7) Under this test, even an adult
child can maintain an action for loss of support. 80 An action will not
succeed, however, where the loss is only a slight diminution in
support. 8 I
B. Comparative Fault
The other statute at issue in Herrly was Minnesota's comparative
fault statute.8 2 When the legislature incorporated comparative fault
into the Dram Shop Act, the complicity issue was not resolved.83
Although complicity and comparative fault have long been features
of Minnesota law,84 the express incorporation of comparative fault
into the Dram Shop Act suggests that the relationship between the
two statutes should be closely examined. There may be aspects of
comparative fault which suggest a particular resolution of the com-
plicity issue confronted in Herrly.85
Under the common law of negligence, if a plaintiff was causally
negligent in causing his own injuries, the plaintiff was precluded
from recovery by his contributory negligence.86 The harshness of
the contributory negligence rule was mitigated first by judicial doc-
trines,87 and later by comparative negligence statutes.8 8 Compara-
79. Bundy, 265 Minn. 549, 552-53, 122 N.W.2d 585, 588-89 (1963) (parents of
ten-year-old boy could not bring loss of support action where child did not contrib-
ute financially to support of family).
80. See, e.g., Glaesemann, 268 Minn. at 435, 130 N.W.2d at 45 (parents of adult
child can bring loss of support claim).
81. Bmndy, 265 Minn. 549, 122 N.W.2d 585.
82. MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1. See supra note 37.
83. See Act of June 2, 1977, ch. 390, § 1, 1977 Minn. Laws 887 (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. § 304A.801 (Supp. 1985)).
84. Minnesota has a long standing commitment to the complicity doctrine. See
supra text accompanying note 97.
85. See infra notes 138-46.
86. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS § 65 (5th ed. 1984).
87. The most commonly accepted modification of the rule of contributory negli-
gence is the doctrine of last clear chance. Id; see e.g., Gill v. Minneapolis, St. Paul,
Rochester & Dubuque Elec. Traction Co., 129 Minn. 142, 151 N.W. 896 (1915) (if
defendant had last clear opportunity to avoid the harm, plaintiff's negligence is not
the proximate cause of injury).
88. The former statute provided:
604.01 Comparative Negligence; Effect.
Subdivision I. Scope of Application. Contributory negligence shall not bar
recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover
damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or prop-
erty, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person
against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be dimin-
ished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the per-
son recovering. The court may, and when requested by either party shall,
direct the jury to find separate special verdicts determining the amount of
damages and the percentage of negligence attributable to each party; and
[Vol. 12
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tive negligence statutes reduce a plaintiffs recovery rather than
preclude recovery altogether. Consequently, a plaintiff's misconduct
is compared to the misconduct of the other parties, and his recovery
is reduced in proportion to whatever fault the factfinder assigns to
the plaintiff.89
Minnesota's comparative negligence statute was adopted in 1969.
In 1978, Minnesota's comparative negligence statute became a com-
parative fault statute.9 0 The effect of this amendment was to expand
the theories of recovery and the defenses that were subject to com-
parison. 9 I For example, under comparative fault, the defendant may
no longer assert as a defense an "unreasonable assumption of risk
not constituting express consent."92 Rather, assumption of the risk
becomes one factor to be considered in apportioning fault. Under
Minnesota's comparison formula, the plaintiffs fault will not bar re-
covery as long as a plaintiff's fault is "not greater than the fault of the
person93 against whom recovery is sought. ... 94 Thus, Minnesota
has adopted a modified form of comparative fault along with the in-
dividual comparison rule95 where multiple defendants are involved.
III. OTHER JURISDICTIONS
The precise issue in Herrly is whether complicity will continue as an
the court shall then reduce the amount of such damages in proportion to the
amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering. When there
are two or more persons who are jointly liable, contribution to awards shall
be in proportion to the percentage of negligence attributable to each, pro-
vided, however, that each shall remain jointly and severally liable for the
whole award.
Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069, 1067 (formerly codified at
MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1 (1971)).
89. See supra note 37.
90. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 7, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 893-40 (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. la (1984)).
91. See Steenson, The Fault with Comparative Fault-The Problem of Individual Com-
parisons in a 11odified Comparative Fault Jurisdiction, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 9
(1985).
92. Minnesota Statutes section 604.01, subdivision la states that
'[flault' includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reck-
less toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a
person to strict tort liability. The term also includes breach of warranty, unrea-
sonable assumption of risk not constituting an express consent, misuse of a product
and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages. Legal
requirements of causal relation apply both to fault as the basis for liability
and to contributory fault.
MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. la (emphasis added).
93. Under Minnesota's comparative fault statute, the plaintiff's fault is compared
individually to each defendant's fault. The alternative formula compares plaintiff's
fault with the aggregate fault of all defendants. See supra note 37.
94. MINN. STAT. § 604.01.
95. See Steenson, note 13, at 2-3.
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absolute preclusion to dram shop recovery. The question is whether
the express incorporation of comparative fault into the Dram Shop
Act9 6 should be viewed as an indication of an intent to have the com-
plicity "defense" compared along with other defenses. The precise
issue has not been litigated elsewhere and, as a result, other jurisdic-
tions offer little clear guidance.
Most jurisdictions have some form of comparative fault97 and all
96. See supra note 38.
97. There are four types of comparative fault:
(1) the slight-gross form (recovery only if plaintiffs negligence was slight in
comparison to defendant's), (2) the even-division form (dividing the dam-
ages evenly, or pro-rata, among the parties), (3) one of the two modified
forms (plaintiff can recover reduced damages if his negligence was either
(a) "not as great as" or (b) "not greater than" that of defendant), and (4) the
"pure" form (diminished recovery allowed even though plaintiff's negli-
gence is greater than that of defendant).
Wade, Uniforn Comparative Fault Act, 14 FORUM 379, 384 (1978).
At present, 45 states, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, have adopted compar-
ative negligence schemes. Of the 15 states and Puerto Rico that have selected a pure
comparative negligence approach, six states and Puerto Rico have adopted this sys-
tem by legislative enactment. These states are Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-
2505 (Supp. 1985); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2323 (West Supp. 1986); Mis-
sissippi, Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); New York, N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 1411
(McKinney Supp. 1986); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-20-4 (1985); Washington,
WASH. REV. CODES ANN. § 4.22.005 (1984). Nine states have judicially adopted
"pure" comparative negligence. Alaska, Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975);
California, Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 858 (1975); Florida, Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Illinois,
Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981); Iowa, Goetzman v. Wichern, 327
N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1982); Kentucky, Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984); Mich-
igan, Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979); Mis-
souri, Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983); New Mexico, Scott v. Rizzo, 96
N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1984).
Thirty states and the Virgin Islands adhere to some variety of modified compara-
tive negligence. Fifteen of those states have adopted the "not greater than" form of
modified comparative fault. All 15 have adopted it legislatively. They are Connecti-
cut, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h (a) (Supp. 1985); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 8132 (Supp. 1984); Hawaii, HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-31(a)(1976); Indiana, IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-4 (West Supp. 1985); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN LAWS. ANN. ch.
231, § 85 (West 1985); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1984); Montana, MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (1985); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1985); New Hamp-
shire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.7a (1983); NewJersey, NJ. REV. STAT. § 2A:15-5.1
(Supp. 1985); Ohio, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Baldwin 1981); Oregon, OR.
REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1983); Pennsylvania, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(a) (Pur-
don 1982); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (Supp. 1985); and Wisconsin,
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1983). The seven states that follow the "not as
great as" form of modified comparative fault are Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-
1765 (1983); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111(1)(1973); Idaho, IDAHO CODE
§ 6-801 (1979); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(a) (1983); North Dakota, N.D.
CENT. CODE § 9-10-7 (1975); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (1953); and Wyo-
ming, Wvo. STAT. § 1-1-109(a) (1985).
Only three states have adopted some version of the "slight-guess" rule. They
fl7LLL.1 11TCIIELIL I_!1F'RE17Eil"
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jurisdictions have liquor control statutes. 98 In those jurisdictions
with dram shop acts similar to Minnesota's, the complicity doctrine is
well-established.9 Also, these jurisdictions tend to characterize
complicity more as a statutory preclusion than as a defense.OO This
characterization would suggest treating complicity as a preclusion,
unaffected by comparative fault. It must be noted, however, that
there are considerable differences among the various states' dram
shop laws and comparative negligence/fault statutes. 10 1 These dif-
are Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1943); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 20-9-2 (1979); and Tennessee, Street v. Calvert, 541 S.W.2d 576 (Tenn.
1976).
98. See ALA. CODE §§ 28-7-21, 28-3-260 (1975 & Supp. 1985); A.ASKA STAT.
§§ 04.16.030-04.16.51 (1980); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-241, 4-244(d) (1974);
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-529, 48-902.01, 48-903 (1977); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 25602.1, 25658 (West 1964 & Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-86 (West
1975 & Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 713 (1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 25-121
(West 1981 & Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 562.11, 562.50 (West Supp. 1986);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-3-22, 3-3-23 (1982 & Supp. 1985); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 281-78
(1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 23-312, 23-929 (1977); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 43, § 131 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 7.1-5-7-8, 7.1-5-10-14, 7.1-5-10-15 (1982 &
West Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.49 (West Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-715 (Supp. 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. § 244-080 (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 14:91, 26:88, 26:683 (West 1974 & Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 28, §§ 303,
1058 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B. § 118 (Supp. 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
138 §§ 34, 69 (West 1974 & Supp. 1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 436.29, 436.33
(1978 & Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. § 340A.502-.503 (Supp. 1985); MIss. CODE ANN.
§§ 67-1-81, 76-1-83 (Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 311.310 (Vernon 1959); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 16-6-304, 45-5-624 (1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-180 (1984); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 202.055 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 175:6, 175:6a (Supp. 1985);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 33:1-39, 33:1-77 (West Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-7A-
16, 60-7B-1, 60-7B-1.1 (1981 & Supp. 1983); N.Y. ALCO. BEV. Corr. LAW § 65 (Mc-
Kinney 1970 & Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-305 (1983); N.D. CENr. CODE
§ 5-01-9 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4301.69 (Page 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
37, § 537 (West Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 471.410 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47,
§ 4-493 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1985); R,I. GEN. LAWS §§ 3-8-1, 3-8-6 (Supp. 1985);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-3-990 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 35-4-
78, 35-9-1 (1977 & Supp. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-4-203 (Supp. 1985); TEX.
ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. §§ 101.63, 106.03 (Vernon 1978 & Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 32A-14-1 (Supp. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 658 (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE
§ 4-62 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE § 66.44.270 (West 1985); W. VA. CODE § 60-3-22
(1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 125.07 (West Supp. 1984); Wvo. STAT. § 12-6-101 (Supp.
1985).
99. See, e.g., Osinger v. Christian, 43 Ill. App. 2d 450, 193 N.E.2d 572 (1963)
(complicity is a defense to dram shop liability; contributory negligence is not);
Cookinham v. Sullivan, 23 Conn. Supp. 193, 179 A.2d 840 (1963) (Dram Shop Act
does not contemplate giving remedy to one who joins and participates in violation of
Act); Hill v. Alexander, 321 Ill. App. 406, 53 N.E.2d 307 (1944) (complicity preclu-
sion is not contributory negligence).
100. Id.
101. See supra notes 97-98.
19861
15
Koziol: Minnesota's Dramshop Act: Is the Complicity Doctrine Obsolete? [H
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1986
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA 11 REI'IEII[
ferences may well undermine the relevance of other states' decisions
to Minnesota's treatment of the issue.
IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 17, 1981, the plaintiff and defendant decided to "go
drinking."102 Taking turns purchasing drinks, the two friends pro-
ceeded to encourage and facilitate each other's intoxication. From
their own admission, their drinking became quite excessive.103 As
Judge Wozniak of the court of appeals stated, "By all rights, they
should not have been standing, let alone driving, that night. Drive
they did, however, with tragic results."104 The bar-to-bar escapade
resulted in an auto accident which left the plaintiff a quadriplegic.
The liquor vendors asserted the plaintiffs complicity as an absolute
"defense" to liability because of his involvement in the intoxication
of the injuring party. 0 5
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Court's Rationale
In Herrly v. Muzik, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that com-
plicity is an absolute preclusion to recovery under the Dram Shop
Act. 10 6 Although the legislature has expressly incorporated compar-
ative fault into the Dram Shop Act, and although Minnesota has an
expansive definition of fault,107 complicity will not be subject to
comparison.
The Minnesota Supreme Court based the Herrly decision on two
factors: legislative intent and statutory construction. Although the
court recognized the dual nature of the Dram Shop Act-both penal
and remedial-the penal aspect was emphasized to the exclusion of
the remedial aspect. Accordingly, the supreme court construed the
statute narrowly, and stated that a clear indication from the legisla-
ture was necessary to expand the class of beneficiaries under the
Act.I08 The court asserted that "[c]ommon sense leads us to con-
clude that had the legislature intended to enlarge the class of benefi-
ciaries under the Act . . . different language would have been
employed in the amendments."o' The court has made no effort to
102. HerrlV, 355 N.W.2d at 453.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Strictly speaking, complicity is not a defense, but a statutory restriction on
the classes of plaintiffs who can maintain a dram shop action. See supra note 48 and
accompanying text.
106. 374 N.W.2d at 278-79.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
108. Herry, 374 N.W.2d at 279.
109. Id. at 278.
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reconcile this narrow construction with prior court opinions, thereby
indicating the fundamentally remedial nature of the Dram Shop Act.
This vacillation as to whether the Act is remedial or penal is the pri-
mary impediment to viewing Herrly as a principled decision.
The second rationale the court presented in reaffirming the com-
plicity preclusion involved the increasing costs and unavailability of
dram shop insurance. Referring to the 1985 amendments to the
Dram Shop Act, the court noted that the effect of these changes was
to reduce aggregate recoveries under the Act.I 10 In addition, the
court believed that the 1977 amendment which incorporated com-
parative fault into the Dram Shop Act was also intended by the legis-
lature to reduce recoveries, and thereby, to address the issue of
insurance costs.' II Since including complicity in comparative fault
may have the effect of increasing aggregate recoveries, the court im-
puted the apparent intent of the 1985 amendments to the 1977
amendments and decided that complicity should not be compared
under the statutory scheme. The court did not justify imposing the
intent of the 1985 amendments onto the 1977 legislative action.
The dissenting opinion' 12 reached a different conclusion on the
issue of legislative intent. 1 3 Given the legislature's incorporation of
comparative fault into the Dram Shop Act, and the expanded defini-
tion of fault under Minnesota's comparative fault statute, the dissent
concluded that "it must be presumed, that the legislature clearly in-
tended to preempt the field and eliminate this judicial concept [com-
plicity] as a bar just as it . . . [eliminated] contributory negligence
and secondary assumption of risk as a bar in the tort field."] 14 The
dissent also criticized the majority's decision as perpetuating "arbi-
trary distinctions among parties suing under the Act."' 15 Specifi-
cally, it was unclear to the dissenters why the purchase of one drink,
as distinguished from other involvement with the injuring parties'
intoxication, should necessarily bar recovery.' 1t
B. Critique
The majority opinion in Herrly can be criticized on four grounds.
First, the court's strict construction of the statute was unwarranted.
Second, the clear indication from the legislature, which the court felt
110. Id. at 279.
111. Id.
112. Hen-ly, 374 N.W.2d at 279-80 (Scott. j., dissenting).
113. The legislative history and rationale in support of the 1977 amendment is not
revealed by the legislative hearing tapes. Brief for Appellant at 13, Herrlv v. Muzik.
355 N.W.2d 452 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
114. Herrly, 374 N.W.2d at 280.
115. Id.
116. Id.; see infra text accompanying note 144.
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was necessary to expand the Dram Shop Act's scope, may have al-
ready been given. Third, the complicity doctrine has diminished
utility in the comparative fault context. Last, the Herrly decision is
inconsistent with Minnesota's progressive approach to tort law and
its increasingly liberal construction of the Dram Shop Act.
1. Penal vs. Remedial Goals
The prevailing view in Minnesota is that remedial statutes are to
be liberally construed.' 17 Conversely, penal statutes are to be nar-
rowly or strictly construed. 18 The Minnesota Supreme Court has, at
times, construed the Dram Shop Act liberally to provide a remedy,
but at other times, it has construed the Act narrowly, focusing only
on its penal characteristics. In Herrly, the court narrowly construed
the Act and required a "clear indication from the legislature to ex-
pand the class of beneficiaries."119
As the court noted, the assumption that the Dram Shop Act is a
penal statute is not entirely consistent with prior decisions.12o Past
decisions have liberally construed the Act "so as to suppress the mis-
chief and advance the remedy."121 While the court noted prior in-
consistent treatments, it did not reconcile them with the Herrly
decision.
The court merely relied on Beck v. Groe 122 in support of the narrow
construction it gave the Dram Shop Act in Herrly. The plaintiff in
Beck brought an action under the wrongful death statute. As the stat-
ute required, the plaintiff was the personal representative of the
deceased. 123
The plaintiff was precluded from bringing a dram shop action for
two reasons. First, at that time, 3.2 beer was excluded from the
scope of the Act. '12 4 Since the only liquor sales in Beck were sales of
3.2 beer, the plaintiff had no cause of action under the statute. Sec-
ond, the Act does not create a cause of action for a personal repre-
sentative.125 To circumvent these problems with his dram shop
claim, the plaintiff attempted to tie his dram shop action to his negli-
gence-based wrongful death action.
The plaintiff in Beck attempted to expand the scope of the Dram
117. See, e.g., Harrison v. Schafer Constr. Co., 257 N.W.2d 336 (Minn. 1977); State
v. Moseng, 254 Minn. 263, 95 N.W.2d 6 (1959); Gleason v. Geary, 214 Minn. 499, 8
N.W.2d 808 (1943).
118. Moseng, 254 Minn. at 268, 95 N.W.2d at 11.
119. See supra text accompanying note 108.
120. See, e.g., Hahn, 238 Minn. at 436, 57 N.W.2d at 261.
121. Id.
122. 245 Minn. 28, 70 N.W.2d 886 (1955).
123. MINN. STAT. § 573.02 (Supp. 1985).
124. See Beck, 245 Minn. at 33-42, 70 N.W.2d at 892-95.
125. See MINN. STAT. § 340A.801 (Supp. 1985).
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Shop Act in a way that contravened the direct and express language
of the Act. The Beck claim extended well beyond the expansion
sought in Herrly. The plaintiff in Herrly sought nothing that directly
contravened the statute. Indeed, in contrast to Beck, the entire re-
quirement that plaintiff be an innocent third party is a judicial crea-
tion, not derived from the language of the statute.12 6 This
distinction between the two cases demonstrates that the narrow con-
struction of Beck ought not to govern Herrly.
The court's attention to the cost and unavailability of dram shop
insurance highlights a further difficulty with the narrow penal con-
struction of the Act.' 2 7 By focusing on the effects which the court's
holding would have on the insurance industry in complicity cases,
the court was looking at the remedial nature of the Act. Once the
court recognized the Act's remedial nature, it should have gone on
to liberally construe the Act as applied to the facts of this case.
In short, though the court claims a narrow reading of the statute is
required based on the Act's penal characteristics, a remedial inter-
pretation, nonetheless, creeps into the Herrly opinion. An acknowl-
edgment of the remedial feature of the Dram Shop Act would
require the court to liberally construe the Act and compare the fault
of the plaintiff, rather than preclude his claim based upon complicity.
The court has previously recognized that Minnesota's Dram Shop
Act has both a remedial and a penal component.128 The bare asser-
tion that the statute is penal is inconsistent with previous decisions
and with the insurance analysis provided by the court. This narrow
construction merely facilitates the decision that complicity precludes
the plaintiff's claim without providing a rationale for overlooking the
remedy the Act was meant to provide.
2. Prior Legislative Indications
In 1978, Minnesota expanded its comparative negligence statute
into a comparative fault statute. 129 The new definition of "fault" sig-
nificantly expanded the theories of recovery and the defenses subject
to comparison.130 For example, actions and defenses based on theo-
ries other than negligence are now also subject to comparison. The
expanded definition of fault expressly creates a possibility of recov-
ery for a plaintiff's "unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting
express consent."1 3 1 This expansion-to allow recovery for assump-
126. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
127. Herrly, 374 N.W.2d at 279.
128. Id.
129. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 840 (codified as amended
at MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. Ia (1984)).
130. See Steenson, supra note 13, at 9.
131. See supra notes 91-94.
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tion of risk-is significant in an analysis of the complicity preclusion.
In previous decisions, the court has treated complicity and assump-
tion of risk as analogous concepts.' 3 2 Thus, it seems appropriate
that where the concepts are analogous, the remedies provided
should be similar in both situations. The court could reasonably
have concluded that the legislature's incorporation of assumption of
risk into the new definition of comparative fault provided a clear in-
dication of intent to include complicity within the same comparison
scheme.133 The express incorporation of comparative fault into the
Dram Shop Act can be viewed as an invitation to compare the actions
of a complicious plaintiff to the actions of the defendant and to allow
recovery where appropriate.
It is significant that the 1985 dram shop amendments3 4 were en-
acted at a time when the Minnesota Court of Appeals' decision in
Herrly was controlling.'35 The court of appeals held that complicity
was a form of fault to be compared. In enacting the 1985 dram shop
amendments, the legislature did not attempt to modify the Herrly
holding. This inaction indicates acquiescence to the Herrly result,
and provides a sufficiently clear indication of legislative intent to en-
able the supreme court to overrule the complicity preclusion and al-
low plaintiffs fault to be compared as any other form of fault.136
3. Complicity: An Arbitrary Distinction?
A final criticism of the Herrly decision is that it provides a rule that
is inappropriate in a comparative fault context. Minnesota Statutes
section 645.17 sets forth presumptions to be made in ascertaining
legislative intent.137 Section one articulates a general canon of con-
struction that the legislature does not intend a result that is "absurd,
132. The Minnesota Supreme Court has described complicity in terms analogous
to those used in describing assumption of risk. See Alartinson, 297 Minn, 48, 209
N.W.2d 906, Heveron v. Village of Belgrade, 288 Minn. 395, 181 N.\A.2d 692
(1970).
133. See Kentrowicz v. VFW 20, 349 N.W.2d 597, 599 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (as-
sumption of risk is comparable fault). The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that
assumption of risk is analogous to complicity. See Iarinsopi, 297 Minn. 48, 209
N.W.2d 906; Heveron, 288 Minn. 395. 181 N.W.2d 692. Since comparative fault
removes secondary assumption of risk as a complete defense, it should also remove
complicity as a conplete defense. .Ilarinsm and tleveron, however, were pre-compar-
ative fault cases so the complicity/assunption of risk analogy can be questioned in
the comparative fault context.
134. See Act ofJune 7, 1985. ch. 309, §§ 7-13, 1985 Minn. Laws 1537, 1540-48
(codified at MINN. ST'rAT. §§ 340A.409: 340A.801; 340A.802 (Supp. 1985)).
135. Herrly, 355 N.W.2d 452 (holding that comlplicity is analogous to assumption
of risk and is comparative fiult).
136. The dissent concurs with this analysis. See supra notes I12-16 and accompa-
nying text.
137. MINN. STAT. § 645.17 (1984).
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impossible of execution or unreasonable."138 It is also implicit in
statutory construction that statutes should be interpreted so as to
avoid unjust or absurd results.139
The continued adherence to the complicity doctrine in a compara-
tive fault context may well result in arbitrary results. Embodied in
the complicity doctrine has always been the distinction between the
injured party's active participation versus a passive participation in
the intoxication of the injuring party.' 4 0 While this distinction may
have been viable outside the comparative fault context, the existence
of comparative fault substantially lessens the utility of the distinction.
Under comparative fault, the factfinder apportions the fault of all the
parties.141 Under such apportionment, it is no longer necessary to
assume that an individual who purchased liquor for the injuring
party is more responsible for his own injury than the commercial
vendor. Given the fair result that can be achieved through appor-
tioning fault, the arbitrary, black/white distinction created by distin-
guishing between active and passive participation is too simplistic
and often unfair.
Hempstead v. Minneapolis Sheraton Corp. 142 provides an example of
the inherent unfairness that may result by not comparing fault under
the Dram Shop Act. The plaintiff in Hempstead was held not to have
been an active participant in the defendant's intoxication and was
allowed to recover under the Dram Shop Act. Consistent with the
prevailing view, complicity was not present because the plaintiff had
purchased no liquor for the defendant.143 The plaintiff was, how-
ever, a participant in the intoxication process. She was the defend-
ant's older sister, and she accompanied her sister to various bars
throughout the evening of the accident. She knew that her sister was
buying liquor. She knew that her sister was under age. She also
knew that her sister was misrepresenting her age to the various li-
quor vendors. Testimony also suggested that the plaintiff knew that
her sister, the driver, was intoxicated when she left the last liquor
establishment. Nonetheless, since the plaintiff did not purchase the
intoxicants, she was held not to have been an active participant.14 4
The notion that the Hempstead plaintiff is less responsible than one
who purchases a single drink presents an absurd result which could
be prevented by comparing fault under the comparative fault provi-
138. Id., subd. 1.
139. Wipperman Mercantile Co. v. Jacobson, 133 Minn. 326, 158 N.W. 606
(1916).
140. See supra notes 48-49 and accompany-ing lext.
141. See supra notes 93-94.
142. 283 Minn. 1, 166 N.W.2d 95 (1969).
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sions of the Act. As the dissent in Herrly points out, "It is arbitrary to
distinguish between a person who buys one drink for a companion
and a person who spends an entire evening with a person, knowing
that that person is buying alcohol illegally."'45
Even considering the advantages of comparative fault, Herrly may
not provide the best case for challenging the continued use of com-
plicity as an absolute preclusion to recovery. The plaintiff in Herrly
had such an extensive involvement with the injuring party's intoxica-
tion that he may well have been over fifty percent at fault. Thus,
comparing his fault may have had no effect on the ultimate outcome
of the suit. 146
A more difficult issue arises where a would-be plaintiff has
purchased only one drink for the injuring party. Under current Min-
nesota law, the purchase of a single drink can create liability under
the Dram Shop Act. 14 7 Presumably, then, the purchase of a single
drink could raise the complicity doctrine and preclude recovery.
Hempstead demonstrates the "absurd result" that arises when a
plaintiff purchasing a single drink for the injuring party is precluded
from recovery while a plaintiff such as Hempstead is allowed to pro-
ceed with her claim because she was only passively involved.
CONCLUSION
Minnesota has always been a progressive jurisdiction in tort mat-
ters.148 The supreme court has seldom been reluctant to modify the
common law to reflect major shifts in tort doctrine, or to be one of
the first jurisdictions to initiate those changes. 149 Furthermore, Min-
nesota has, in the past, been willing to expand the scope of the Dram
Shop Act without legislative initiation. 150 Against this backdrop, the
Herrly decision is particularly troubling.
Nonetheless, Minnesota will continue to recognize plaintiff com-
plicity as an absolute preclusion to recovery under the Dram Shop
Act. Although the court of appeals recognized the advantages of
comparing fault under the comparative fault statute, 15 1 the Minne-
sota Supreme Court did not find these advantages compelling. Ac-
cordingly, Minnesota courts must continue the mechanistic practice
145. Herrly, 374 N.W.2d at 280 (Scott, J., dissenting).
146. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
148. Steenson, The Anatomy of Products Liability ii Mimesota: The Theories of Recovery,
6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1980).
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Wegan v. Lexington, 309 N.W.2d 273 (Minn. 1981) (rejection of
historical distinction between 3.2 beer and other intoxicating beverages); Ross, 294
Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d 149 (imposition of social host liability).
151. Herr/y, 355 N.W.2d 455.
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of precluding recovery for all plaintiffs who have had any involve-
ment in furnishing the injuring party's intoxicants.
Michael Koziol
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